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ORDERS AND MANDATES

Stay denied because of attorney's conflict of interest.

CPLR 2201 provides that the court in which an action is
pending may grant a stay of proceedings. While this is a discretionary power,38 such discretion is normally exercised only when
other remedies are inadequate and the equities are compelling.39
Stays have been denied when danger of harm to the party requesting the stay is not imminent. 40 However, pending actions have
judgment that
been stayed when another action for a declaratory
4
will bear heavily on the first action is brought. 1
The question of what factors should be considered when
42
granting a stay was before the court recently in Treiber v.Hopson,
in which the scope of the inquiry was held to include the ethics
of the attorney. A stay of a negligence action was requested
by defendant's counsel, presumably without his client's knowledge.
This attorney had been furnished by the defendant's insurance
company. The reason for the request was the initiation of a
declaratory judgment action by the insurance company to declare
the7 policy void. This declaratory judgment action was being
prosecuted by the same attorney who was representing the defendant
in the negligence action. The appellate division denied the stay
because the attorney was acting against the best interests of the
43
defendant in contravention of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
In considering this additional factor, the courts have again
moved toward more realistic solutions to the procedural problems
caused when an insurance company attorney defends a policy
holder.
CPLR 2214: Deficiency in notice held to be procedural defect.
CPLR 2214(b) provides that "a notice of motion . . . shall
be served at least eight days before the time at which the motion
is noticed to be heard." This period is44 extended an additional
three days when service is made by mail.
38
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40 Ibid. See also Ticon Corp. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp.,
206 Misc. 727, 134 N.Y.S.2d 716 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
41 Cf., Hunter v. Hunter, 10 App. Div. 2d 937, 201 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1st
Dep't 1960) (memorandum decision); Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Lipsky,
9 Misc. 2d 390, 170 N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1958).
4227 App. Div. 2d 151, 277 N.Y.S.2d 241 (3d Dep't 1967).
43 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcS Nos. 6,

44 CPLR 2103(b) (2).
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

In Baciagalupo v. Baciogalupo," the court granted plaintiff's
motion to serve a supplemental complaint even though defendant
was given only ten days notice served by mail. Admitting that
the decided "numerical" weight of authority has considered such
a deficiency a jurisdictional defect which would deprive it of
any authority to hear the substance of the motion," the court
nevertheless interpreted the most recent precedent as treating the
which might be disimproper notice as a procedural irregularity
47
regarded absent prejudice to the defendant.
In so holding, the court discounted the significance of the
eleven day requirement as a strict jurisdictional prerequisite by
outlining several avenues of circumvention. It was noted that the
defect might be readily waived by any opposition on the merits ;48
furthermore, the defect might be avoided altogether by an order
to show cause.49 The court, in reaching its decision, relied heavily.
on Shanty Hollow Corp. v. Poladian,° a case which found it to be
within the discretion of the court under CPLR 2214(c) to hear
a jurisdictional motion without notice.5' While the court in the
instant case treated lightly the fact that the motion in Shanty
Hollow was addressed to a jurisdictional question, that very fact
may have caused the court there to dispense with the notice
requirement.
Though the instant case bears no factual resemblance to
Shanty Hollow, the court adopted a realistic approach. Since there
had been no prejudice to the defendant, and since there apparently
was no denial of due process, a strict requirement of the eleven
days notice would have proved a meaningless exercise in procedural formalism. Perhaps, in granting the motion, the court
Misc. 2d 13, 277 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct Suffolk County 1967).
Miot v. Jo Carl Realty Corp., 19 App. Div. 2d 889, 244 N.Y.S.2d
721 (2d Dep't 1963), 2wdified, 20 App. Div. 2d 664, 246 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1964) ;
Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 45 Misc. 2d 681, 257 N.Y.S.2d
360 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
47 Baciagalupo v. Baciagalupo, 53 Misc. 2d 13, 14, 277 N.Y.S2d 260, 261
(Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1967).
4s Todd v. Gull Contracting Co., 22 App. Div. 2d 904, 255 N.Y.S.2d
452 (2d Dep't 1964).
4' CPLR 2214(d) states: "The court in a proper case may grant an
order to show cause, to be served in lieu of a notice of motion, at a time
and in a manner specified therein."
5023 App. Div. 2d 132, 259 N.Y.S2d 541 (3d Dep't 1965), aff'd, 17
N.Y.2d 536, 215 N.E.2d 168, 267 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1966). There, appellants
appeared "specially" and objected to the jurisdiction of the court because
of improper delivery of a notice and petition-the court sustained appellants'
objection as an oral motion without notice.
G1See CPLR 2214(c), which provides: "Only papers served shall be
read in support of, or in opposition to, the motion, unless the court for
good cause sludl otherwise direct" (emphasis added).
4553
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was trying to give expression to the statutory mandate that
pleadings be liberally construed. 52 But it is more likely that
the result in the present case is attributable to the nature of
the motion being heard. 3
ARTICLE 30-REMEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3013:

Request for equitable relief not fatal where facts
indicated legal relief was proper.
In Lane v. Mercury Record Corp.,54 the appellate division,
first department, held that a complaint which asked for equitable
relief could not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action
merely because the complaint only stated facts sufficient for legal
relief. Recently, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, 55
thereby making it applicable to the whole state.
CPLR 3013 requires that "statements in a pleading shall
be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of
the transactions ...or occurrences ...intended to be proved and
the material elements of each cause of action or defense." "I
This section underlines the plan of the CPLR to do away with
the technicalities of pleading-to sustain any cause of action which
can be found within the pleading.57 It is, therefore, a departure
from the old law which required that a pleading state "material
facts" only. 58 Now, pleadings must only identify the transaction,
and the facts alleged must be sufficient to entitle plaintiff to
relief under some theory of substantive law.59
52

CPLR 3026.

CPLR 3025 provides that supplemental pleadings be "freely given
upon such terms as may be just" Furthermore, under CPA § 105, amendments to pleadings were liberally granted so as to permit complete litigation
of the issues. Sec 3 WEiNsTEiN, KORN & MmLER, N-w YoRx CrVm
53

PRAcTicE 3025.11 (1965).
5421 App. Div. 2d 602, 252 N.Y.S.2d 1011 (1st Dep't 1964).
The
plaintiff had asked for an accounting, and while such equitable relief was
unavailable under the alleged facts, the facts did show a cause of action

in contract
with damages as the appropriate remedy.
55
Lane v. Mercury Records Corp., 18 N.Y.2d 889, 223 N.E.2d 35, 276

N.Y.S.2d 626 (1966).

56 CPLR 3013.
577B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3013, supp. commentary 60 (1966).
58 CPA § 241.
7B McKnqNEY's CPLR 3013, supp. commentary 60
(1966); 3 WEINSTEIN, KoiR & MnwfR, NEW Yopau CivIL PRAcTIcE

113013.01
(1965).
59
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case does, however, directly overrule Jackson v. Strong, 222 N.Y. 149, 118

N.E. 512 (1917), and Terner v. Glickstein & Terner, Inc., 283 N.Y. 299,
28 N.E.2d 846 (1940), wherein the Court of Appeals held that where the

